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THE REGULATION OF MARKET MANIPULATION IN AUSTRALIA: A 
HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
H Chitimira* 
1 Introduction  
Notably, in Australia, market abuse practices1 like market manipulation2 and other 
market misconduct practices3 are expressly prohibited under the Corporations Act4 as 
amended by the Financial Services Reform Act.5 In the light of this, and for the 
purposes of this article, a brief historical analysis of the market manipulation 
prohibition will be undertaken first. Secondly, the available penalties and remedies for 
                                        
*  Howard Chitimira. LLB, LLM (UFH), LLD (NMMU). Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, North-West 
University. E-mail: Howard.Chitimira@nwu.ac.za. This article was influenced in part by Chitimira's 
doctoral thesis entitled A Comparative Analysis of the Enforcement of Market Abuse Provisions 354-
420. 
1  For the purposes of this article, such practices include insider trading (which is the unlawful use of 
price-sensitive non-public inside information, to conclude transactions in securities to which that 
information relates by insiders or other persons to the detriment of innocent and other unwitting 
persons), market manipulation and other market misconduct activities. See related discussion on 
the regulation of these practices by Huang 2005 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 281-322; Huang 2005 Sec 
Reg LJ 130-146; Overland 2005 Deakin LR 708, 713-730; Steinberg 2001 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 635, 
640-668; Gevurtz 2002 Transnat'l Law 63, 67-78; Gething 1998 C & SLJ 607-618; Goldwasser 
1999 ABLR 482-513; Tomasic and Pentony 1989 ANZJ Crim 65-66; Loke 2006 Am J Comp L 123-
172; Barnes Stock Market Efficiency 125; Lyon and Du Plessis Law of Insider Trading 159-168. 
2  In this article, market manipulation is defined as a practice that interferes or attempts to interfere 
with the free and fair operation of the financial markets by creating an artificial, false or misleading 
appearance with respect to the price of, or market for, a security, commodity or financial 
instrument. For the purposes of this article, such practices include the misuse of material 
information; the dissemination of false or misleading information; a practice which abnormally or 
artificially affects, or is likely to affect, the formation of prices or volumes of financial instruments 
or securities; dark pools and wash trades.  
3  For the purposes of this article, such practices include false trading and market rigging, quote 
stuffing, front running, insider trading, and a failure to continuously disclose price-sensitive 
information that relates to the relevant financial instruments. 
4  The Corporations Act 50 of 2001 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations 
Act.  
5  The Financial Services Reform Act 122 of 2001 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the 
Financial Services Reform Act. Generally see the Corporations Act, s 1041A for market 
manipulation; s 1041B for false trading and market rigging, including the creation of a false or 
misleading appearance of active trading; s 1041C for false trading and market rigging, including 
artificially maintaining a trading price; s 1041D for the dissemination of information about illegal 
transactions; s 1041E for false or misleading statements; s 1041F for inducing other persons to a 
deal; s 1041G for dishonest conduct and s 1041H for misleading or deceptive conduct (civil liability 
only). For a detailed analysis of these provisions, see the discussion that will ensue later under the 
sub-headings in para 2 and also see Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act. See further Huang 2009 C 
& SLJ 8-22.  
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market manipulation will be discussed. Thereafter, possible recommendations and 
significant Australian anti-market abuse enforcement approaches that may be utilised 
in South Africa6 will be briefly presented.7 Lastly, concluding remarks are provided.  
2  Historical overview of the prohibition of market manipulation 
2.1  The prohibition of market manipulation under the common law 
Australia, like many other jurisdictions,8 does not statutorily define the concept of 
"market abuse" and other related practices like market manipulation. However, it is 
generally accepted that market manipulation activities were outlawed under common 
law in the years prior to 18999 and later codified in 1899 in Australia.10 Therefore, like 
the United Kingdom (UK),11 Australia primarily prohibited market manipulation through 
common law principles.12 Market manipulation is usually interpreted to include 
                                        
6  Generally see ss 78; 80; 81 and 82 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, hereinafter referred 
to as the Financial Markets Act. See Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 130; Van Deventer 2008 
http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf 1-5; Myburgh and Davis 2004 
http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf 8-13; also see Chitimira Enforcement of 
Market Abuse Provisions 354-420; Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 1-18; Botha 1990 SALJ 504-508; 
Chitimira Regulation of Insider Trading 137-163; Osode 2000 J Afr L 239; Jooste 2006 SALJ 437, 
441-460; Van Deventer 1999 FSB Bulletin 2-3; Luiz 1999 SA Merc LJ 136-151; Luiz 2011 SA Merc 
LJ 151-172; Beuthin and Luiz Basic Company Law 235-238; Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 155-
165, for further related historical analysis on the regulation of market manipulation and insider 
trading in South Africa. 
7  In relation to this, the historical analysis and recommendations will be mainly focused on the 
relevant provisions of the Corporations Act and the Financial Markets Act in Australia and South 
Africa respectively. 
8  Such jurisdictions or countries include the United States of America (USA) and South Africa. 
9  Put differently, the fact that the common law prohibition was codified in 1899 could also suggest 
that the prohibition under the common law pre-dates 1899. 
10  See the codification of common law as undertaken in the Australian states of Queensland in 1899, 
Western Australia in 1902 and Tasmania in 1924. Accordingly, in Victoria and South Australia 
states, the common law crime principles discouraging inter alia market abuse practices are 
expressly retained under s 321F(2) of the Crimes Act 6231 of 1958 (Vic) and s 133(2) of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 2252 of 1935 (SA). In relation to this, it is important to note that 
market manipulation was historically outlawed as a crime of conspiracy to defraud or deprive other 
persons of their securities or financial instruments which they own and which they are or might be 
entitled to own in Australia, the United Kingdom and the USA. Furthermore, in some instances the 
conspiracies to defraud through market manipulation were treated as a crime only if two or more 
individuals acted together to commit market manipulation under common law. See R v Aspinall 
(1876) 1 QBD 730; R v Aspinall (1876) 2 QBD 48 (Court of Appeal); R v De Berenger (1814) 3 
M&S 67; Wai Yu-Tsang v R [1992] 1 AC 269; Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 
819; Cooke [1986] AC 909. See further Loke 2007 http://goo.gl/YVBTGQ 4-7.  
11  See R v De Berenger (1814) 3 M&S 67. 
12  See further Fame Decorator Industries Pty Limited v Jeffries (1998) 28 ACSR 58, 16 ACLC 1235. 
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activities that interfere with the natural forces of supply and demand of a particular 
security or financial product in Australia.13 
2.2  The prohibition of market manipulation prior to 200114  
Market manipulation was initially prohibited by the Securities Industry Act 1970.15 This 
Act inter alia outlawed the creation of a false or misleading appearance of active 
trading with respect to listed securities or the market for and price of any securities.16 
A similar prohibition was also retained in the statutes which were later enacted.17 The 
Corporations Law 1990 further prohibited market manipulation practices such as the 
making or publication of false or misleading statements,18 the manipulation of the 
futures contracts market and the artificial maintenance of securities trading prices in 
the relevant Australian19 markets.20 The Corporations Law 1990 also prohibited any 
misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of all the relevant persons, especially the 
officers or employees of companies.21 It is stated that the Corporations Law 1990 
                                        
13  Generally see Fame Decorator Industries Pty Limited v Jeffries (1998) 28 ACSR 58, 16 ACLC 1235; 
Fenwick v Jeffries Industries Limited (1995) 13 ACLC 1334. Also see Scott v Brown, Doering, McNab 
& Co [1892] 2 QB 724; Loke 2007 http://goo.gl/YVBTGQ 1-2.  
14  The discussion will be focused mainly on the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 110 of 1990 
(Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Law 1990 and therefore the study of all related 
Australian securities statutes is beyond the scope of this sub-heading. Consequently, related 
legislation like the Trade Practices Act 51 of 1974 (Cth) (hereinafter referred to as the Trade 
Practices Act) as amended by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 2005 (Cth), which 
was passed on 19 October 2006, will be referred to only where necessary.  
15  The Securities Industry Act 53 of 1970 (NSW), hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry 
Act 1970. See s 70 read with s 72(2). 
16  See s 70 read with s 72(2) of the Securities Industry Act 1970. 
17  See further the relevant provisions of the Securities Industry (Amendment) Act 11 of 1971 (NSW), 
hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry Amendment Act; s 109 of the Securities Industry 
Act 3 of 1975 (NSW), hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry Act 1975; s 124 of the 
Securities Industry Act 66 of 1980 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry Act 1980 
and the Securities Industry (Application of Laws) Act 61 of 1981 (NSW), hereinafter referred to as 
the Securities Industry Application of Laws Act. Also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 54, 58; see further 
Armson 2009 http://goo.gl/iDn85l 4-7; Goldwasser 1999 Aust J Leg Hist 149, 166-172, 198; Hart 
1979 ABLR 139-140. 
18  Ss 999, 1261 of the Corporations Law 1990.  
19  Ss 997; 998; 1259 and 1260 read with s 998 of the Corporations Law 1990; also see Huang 2009 
C & SLJ 9-10; Baxt, Black and Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 471-472.  
20  S 998(3) read with subss (5) and (7), 1260(2) and (3) of the Corporations Law 1990; also see 
further s 13.6 of the Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Criminal 
Code Act.  
21  Generally see s 995 of the Corporations Law 109 of 1989 (Cth), also known as the Corporations 
Act 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Law 1989; also see Black 1996 ALJ 987, 997; 
Trichardt 2003 C & SLJ 75, 83.  
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mainly prohibited stock (including securities) market manipulation and market 
rigging22 and its prohibition required proof of mens rea before any liability could be 
imputed to the accused persons. Consequently, the enforcement authorities struggled 
to obtain settlements and convictions in market manipulation cases.23 
2.3  The prohibition of market manipulation under the Corporations Act 
Market manipulation and other related market misconduct activities are currently 
prohibited in the Corporations Act.24 In addition, the scope of application of the market 
manipulation prohibition is now broadly extended to other related activities such as 
market rigging, front running,25 insider trading and a failure to continuously disclose 
price-sensitive information that relates to the relevant financial instruments.26 More 
importantly, among the major amendments made to the Corporations Act by the 
Financial Services Reform Act is the removal, on the part of the prosecution, of the 
explicit requirement of proving the existence of intent from the wording of the market 
manipulation and other related provisions before imputing any liability to the accused 
offenders.27 Furthermore, all persons are prohibited from carrying out transactions 
                                        
22  S 998 of the Corporations Law 1990; also see generally Goldwasser 1998 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 
109; Meyer 1986 C & SLJ 92, 95; Armson 2009 Armson 2009 http://goo.gl/iDn85l 6-7; Goldwasser 
1999a C & SLJ 44, 47. 
23  See s 5.6(1) read with subs (2) of the Criminal Code Act. Also see further Huang 2009 C & SLJ 9-
10.  
24  See Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act. 
25  Front running is an illegal technique that is employed by market participants like brokers to 
anticipate the effect and impact of upcoming trading transactions on the price of certain securities 
in order to engage in market manipulation and other illicit trading activities. See Chitimira May 
2014 MJSS 60, 61. 
26  These changes were introduced by the Financial Services Reform Act, which amended the 
Corporations Act's market abuse provisions. See further the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum. Also see generally related remarks by Longo 2001 https://goo.gl/31VrsC 1-9. See 
further Huang 2009 C & SLJ 9.  
27  See s 1041A read with ss 1041B(1), 1041C, 1041D, 1041E, 1041F, 1041G and 1041H of the 
Corporations Act. The required fault elements for violating s 1041B(1) have now been established. 
Intention is the fault element for the physical element for doing or omitting to do an act as stated 
in that subsection and recklessness is the fault element for having or likely to have the effect of 
creating or causing the creation of a false or misleading appearance, as stated in that subsection. 
See s 1041B(1)(1A) of the Corporations Act. Also see generally the Explanatory Memorandum of 
the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill 2010 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporations 
Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.7 and 3.14. It is hoped that this will, in the 
long run, improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in Australia. See Constable 
2011 MqJBL 107; also see generally Huang 2009 C & SLJ 8-10,16-17; Goldwasser 1999b C & SLJ 
210; and further Armson 2009 http://goo.gl/iDn85l 2-4, 7-12, 16-17, 4-7. 
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which have or are likely to have the effect of creating an artificial price for trading in 
financial products or maintaining at an artificial level a price for trading in the products 
listed on a financial market in Australia.28 As stated above, the current market 
manipulation provisions dispense with the requirement of proving the intention to 
induce others to sell, buy or subscribe to the affected securities or financial products 
before imputing any liability on the accused persons.29 Put simply, the key issue now 
is whether the price of certain financial products is artificial or misleading. Thus, the 
focus is now on the effect of the market manipulative conduct in relation to the 
affected financial product rather than on the intention30 of the trader or the person 
involved. 
In addition, false trading,31 market rigging32 and the creation of a false or misleading 
appearance of active trading in a financial product or with respect to the market for 
or the price for trading in a financial product are expressly prohibited under the 
Corporations Act.33 In addition, what may constitute a false or misleading appearance 
of active trading is outlined in the so-called deeming provisions concerning wash 
sales34 and matched orders.35 Likewise, the carrying out of fictitious transactions, 
                                        
28  Section 1041A of the Corporations Act. 
29  Section 1041A of the Corporations Act; compare with ss 997, 1259 of the Corporations Law 1990. 
30  Sections 5.4(4), 5.2 and 5.6(2) read with s 5.6(1) of the Criminal Code Act.  
31  This occurs when a person negligently or intentionally employs a scheme, device or artifice which 
creates or might create and maintain a false or misleading appearance with respect to the market 
for or price of active trading in any securities or financial instruments on the relevant financial 
markets.  
32  This is usually an unfair and illegal act or practice which is employed by a person or company to 
manipulate the sale or price of securities or financial instruments inter alia by raising or lowering 
the price of securities or financial instruments in order to create a false and misleading appearance 
of active trading in relation to such securities or financial instruments. 
33  Section 1041B(1) of the Corporations Act; also see s 1041B(1)(1A) of the same Act, which outlines 
the fault elements. 
34  A wash sale occurs where a person or an associate is both the buyer and seller in the same 
transaction (selling and repurchasing of the same or substantially the same financial product for 
the purpose of generating activity and increasing its price). S 1041B(2)(a) read with s 1041B(1) of 
the Corporations Act; s 1041B(3) of the Corporations Act sets out circumstances in which an 
acquisition or disposal of financial products does not involve a change in beneficial ownership and 
s 1041B(4) of the Corporations Act enumerates what a transaction of acquisition or disposal of 
financial products includes. 
35  A matched order occurs where a person and his associate place an order to buy or sell at the same 
time, for substantially the same number of securities or financial products at substantially the same 
price. S 1041B(2)(b) read with s 1041B(1) of the Corporations Act. Also see ss 5.2(2), 5.6(2) of 
the Criminal Code Act, where other physical elements are outlined which are taken into account 
by the courts or the prosecuting authorities in determining whether the market manipulation 
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which have the effect of maintaining, fluctuating, inflating or depressing the price for 
trading in the financial products on the relevant financial markets in Australia is 
prohibited.36 
The dissemination of information about illegal transactions is also prohibited in the 
Corporations Act.37 In other words, all persons are prohibited from disseminating any 
statement or information to the effect that the price for trading in a financial product 
on the relevant markets will rise, fall or be maintained, or is likely to rise, fall or be 
maintained.38 Similarly, the reckless or intentional39 making or dissemination of a 
statement or information that is false or misleading materially and which is likely to 
induce other persons to deal in financial products or to affect the price of financial 
products is outlawed in Australia.40 
The Corporations Act further prohibits any person from inducing others to unlawfully 
deal in the relevant financial products.41 Moreover, this provision contains a definition 
of the term "dishonest".42 This prohibition on "inducing others" is now extended to 
conduct such as applying to become a standard employer sponsor of a superannuation 
entity and permitting a person to become a standard employer sponsor of a 
superannuation entity.43 The Corporations Act prohibits any person, in the course of 
carrying on a financial services business in Australia, from engaging in dishonest 
                                        
offences were committed by the accused persons in question. See paras 3.115, 15.15 of the 
Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth) 
(hereinafter referred to as the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum) and the Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum respectively. See further Huang 2009 C & SLJ 10.  
36  Section 1041C of the Corporations Act. 
37  Section 1041D of the Corporations Act. 
38  See s 1041D of the Corporations Act. Also see generally Hieronymus 1977 Hofstra L Rev 41, 45; 
Loke 2007 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 22-50; McCabe 1993 Fordham L Rev 207, 223, which comments 
on the circumstances that are considered necessary when determining if the activity in question 
should be deemed unlawful and manipulative.  
39  Section 1041E(1)(c) of the Corporations Act. 
40  Section 1041E of the Corporations Act, which repealed ss 999 and 1261 of the Corporations Law 
1990; also see generally Ministry of Economic Development 2002 https://goo.gl/jxUg0K. 
41  Section 1041F of the Corporations Act.  
42  In this regard, dishonest means (a) dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people; and 
(b) known by the person to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. Also see 
s 1041F(2) read with s 1041G(2) of the Corporations Act. 
43  Section 1041F(3) of the Corporations Act. Accordingly, the contravention s 1041F will lead to civil 
liability despite the fact that it is not necessarily a civil penalty provision; see further the 
Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum paragraph 3.116. 
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conduct in relation to a financial product or service.44 Dishonest conduct is defined to 
mean dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people, including conduct 
known by any person to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people.45 
This definition seems to contain both subjective and objective elements which must 
be proved by the prosecution in determining if the conduct in question will be 
dishonest as contemplated above.46 
Moreover, conduct in relation to a financial product or service that is misleading or 
deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive other persons with respect to certain financial 
products is broadly prohibited.47 However, this prohibition does not apply to 
misleading or deceptive takeover, compulsory acquisition and fund raising documents 
or disclosure documents or statements, as defined in the Financial Services Reform 
Act.48 However, the prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct may apply: (a) to 
applying to become a standard employer sponsor of a superannuation entity, (b) to 
permitting a person to become a standard employer sponsor of a superannuation 
entity, (c) to a trustee of a superannuation entity's dealing with the beneficiary of that 
entity as such beneficiary, and (d) to a trustee of a superannuation entity's dealing 
with a standard employer sponsor.49 
Other activities that are related to market manipulation such as short selling50 and 
market stabilisation are also outlawed in the Corporations Act. Notwithstanding this 
                                        
44  Section 1041G(1) of the Corporations Act, which is treated as a civil penalty provision but 
nonetheless its contravention may further results in criminal liability on the part of the offenders. 
Also see the Revised Explanatory Memorandum para 15.19.  
45  Section 1041G(2) of the Corporations Act. 
46  This criterion was employed in R v Ghosh [1982] 3 WLR 110; R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 read with 
Boggeln v Williams [1978] 1 W LR 873; R v Feely [1973] QB 530; R v Gilks [1972] 1 WLR 1341; R 
v McIvor [1982] 1 WLR 409; [1982] 1 All ER 491 (CA); also see s 1041G(2) of the Corporations 
Act. 
47  Section 1041H(1) and (2) of the Corporations Act; also see the Revised Explanatory Memorandum 
paras 15.8-15.10, which stipulates that s 1041H repealed and replaced the former provisions of s 
995 of the Corporations Law.  
48  See Parts 7.7 and 7.9 of the Financial Services Reform Act; also s 1041H(3) of the Corporations 
Act; the Revised Explanatory Memorandum para 15.10.  
49  See further the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum paras 3.117, 3.118.  
50  Short selling is a practice which involves selling securities or assets such as derivatives by the seller 
without owning them at the time of the transactions, with the intention of buying them back at a 
later stage but at a much lower price. S 1020B of the Corporations Act. Also see Chitimira May 
2014 MJSS 67-68. 
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general prohibition, short selling and market stabilisation may only be permitted under 
certain requirements as stipulated in the Corporations Act.51 
2.4  Comparative evaluation and analysis of the market manipulation 
prohibition 
Notably, market manipulation was discouraged under the common law in the 
preceding years prior to the 1960s52 and 189953 in both South Africa and Australia 
respectively. Nonetheless, market manipulation practices were statutorily prohibited 
in Australia only in the early 1970s,54 while such practices were outlawed in the late 
1980s in South Africa.55 Prior to this, market manipulation was prohibited in South 
Africa mainly by the common law.56 Moreover, as is the position in Australia,57 the 
concept of and conduct amounting to market manipulation are not statutorily defined 
under the Financial Markets Act.58 
Furthermore, like the situation in Australia,59 market manipulation practices are 
statutorily prohibited under the Financial Markets Act.60 However, it is hoped that the 
Financial Markets Act will be amended to provide an adequate statutory definition of 
the concept of market manipulation involving all the elements of this offence (including 
                                        
51  For example, short selling and market-stabilisation may be allowed where they are the subject of 
a declaration by a market operator (for example a stock exchange) as approved for such short 
selling or market stabilisation purposes. See Chitimira May 2014 MJSS 67-68. 
52  Generally see Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 155-165. 
53  See earlier comments in para 2.1 above. 
54  See the related discussion under para 2.2 above. 
55  Also see the relevant provisions of the now repealed statutes, the Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 
of 1985, hereinafter referred to as the Stock Exchanges Control Act. See s 40 and the Financial 
Markets Control Act 55 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Control Act, see 
ss 20 -23. Notably, s 1 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act prohibited the market manipulation of 
securities, which included stocks, shares and debentures, while the relevant provisions of the 
Financial Markets Control Act prohibited the market manipulation of financial instruments, as 
defined in s 1, including futures contracts, option contracts and loan stock on a financial market. 
Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 34; Henning & Du Toit 2000 JJS 155-165 & Chitimira 2014 PER 
Journal 937-965. 
56  Under the common law, market manipulation is usually referred to as a crime of "rigging the 
market". Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 1) 34; 40-42; Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 155-
165.  
57  See the related remarks in paras 2.1 and 2.3 above. 
58  See ss 78, 80, 81, 82 of the Financial Markets Act and other related provisions under Ch X of the 
same Act. Also see further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 1) 34-35; Chitimira 2014 PER 937-965. 
59  See para 2.3 above. 
60  Sections 80, 81 of the Financial Markets Act.  
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how it is committed) as well as the various types of market manipulation practices,61 
to enhance the combating of such practices in South Africa.62 Like the position under 
the Corporations Act,63 the Financial Markets Act64 also discourages trade-based 
market manipulation.65 It is important to note that the prohibition of trade-based 
market manipulation contained in the Financial Markets Act is relatively similar66 to 
that of the Corporations Act.67 Moreover, the Financial Markets Act prohibits directly 
or indirectly the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements, 
promises or forecasts in respect of the listed securities that relate to the past or future 
performance of a public company.68 However, there is no similar provision in the 
Corporations Act.69 In this respect, the South African prohibition on disclosure-based 
market manipulation is commendably broader70 than that of the Corporations Act.71 
                                        
61  In relations to this, it is submitted that the aforesaid definition should expressly apply to all the 
types and related market manipulation practices such as high frequency trading (a manipulative 
practice that involves persons like brokers, issuers and financial analysts who act in a proprietary 
capacity to employ sophisticated computerised algorithmic decision-making systems in order to 
obtain advantage from some minute discrepancies in the financial markets stock prices and then 
quickly trade in such stocks in large quantities to gain profit), front running, naked short selling 
(which occurs when a seller agrees to short sell a security within a stipulated period without taking 
prior measures to repurchase it at a later stage) and quote stuffing (a manipulative tactic which 
involves the prompt entering and withdrawing of large stock orders by any person in order to flood 
the market with quotes that other persons have to process, thereby causing them to lose their fair 
competitive advantage in such stocks). See Chitimira May 2014 MJSS 61-62, 64, 67-68. 
62  See related remarks by Chitimira 2014 PER 964-965. 
63  See para 2.3 above. 
64  Section 80 of the Financial Markets Act.  
65  Section 80(1)(a) and (b) read with subs (2), s 80(3)(a)-(g) read with subss (4) and (5) of the 
Financial Markets Act; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 1) 42-51, 52-60 and a generally 
related discussion by Chitimira 2014 PER 937-965.  
66  Notably, the same position was also enumerated in s 75 of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, 
hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act; clause 84 of the Draft Financial Markets Bill, 
2011, hereinafter referred to as the Draft Financial Markets Bill, and clause 82 of the Financial 
Markets Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill, 2012 (I have 
employed the term "clause" to refer to the provisions of both the Draft Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill, 2012. In relation to this and for the purposes of this article, the relevant 
provisions of the afore-said Bills and the now repealed Securities Services Act will be referred to 
only where necessary for historical comparative analysis).  
67  See para 2.3 above.  
68  See s 81(1) and (2) read with subs (3). The same status quo was also stipulated in s 76(1) and 
(2) of the Securities Services Act; clause 85(1) and (2) of the Draft Financial Markets Bill and clause 
83 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012.  
69  Section 1041E; also see para 2.3 above. 
70  Section 81 of the Financial Markets Act. Notably, a similar approach was also provided under s 76 
of the Securities Services Act; clause 85 of the Draft Financial Markets Bill; clause 83 of the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2012. See further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 178.  
71  See para 2.3 above. 
H CHITIMIRA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)2 
 
121 
 
In addition, unlike the similar prohibition provided in the Corporations Act,72 the 
prohibition of disclosure-based market manipulation contained in the Financial Markets 
Act73 does not expressly require the inducement of other persons to buy or sell any 
affected listed securities before any liability is imposed on the offenders.74 In addition, 
the concealment or omission of a material fact which gives rise to or which may give 
rise to the making or publication of a statement, promise or forecast that is false or 
deceptive is prohibited under the Financial Markets Act.75 The use of the term "material 
fact" in this prohibition could suggest that fault is required to determine whether the 
concealed or omitted fact could reasonably give rise to disclosure-based market 
manipulation in South Africa.76 On the other hand, the Corporations Act77 and the 
Financial Markets Act's disclosure-based market manipulation prohibition78 may give 
rise to liability on the part of the accused person only where such person knew or 
ought reasonably to have known that the statements he made or published were false 
or misleading. This could further suggest that a similar approach is to be adopted in 
the enforcement of the disclosure-based market manipulation prohibition in both 
Australia and South Africa.79 Moreover, in contrast to the position in Australia80 there 
is no specific provision in the Financial Markets Act which expressly prohibits, directly 
or indirectly, the dissemination of information about illegal transactions and dishonest 
conduct in relation to listed securities.81 In addition, market (price) stabilisation 
                                        
72  See generally s 1041E read with s 1041F and also para 2.3 above.  
73  Section 81 of the Financial Markets Act. 
74  Seemingly, this approach was previously embedded in s 76 of the Securities Services Act; clause 
85 of the Draft Financial Markets Bill; clause 83 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012. See further 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 179-180.  
75  Section 81(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Act. This prohibition was initially provided in s 76(1)(b) 
of the Securities Services Act; clause 85(1)(b) of the Draft Financial Markets Bill and clause 
83(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012.  
76  In other words, the fact that the concealed or omitted fact must be a "material fact" and not just 
merely any fact suggests that fault elements or an objective test will be established and employed 
by the relevant courts. S 81(1) of the Financial Markets Act.  
77  Section 1041E(1)(c)(ii) of the Corporations Act. 
78  Section 81(1) read with subss (2) and (3) of the Financial Markets Act. Likewise, this approach 
was previously employed in s 76(1)(a) read with (b) of the Securities Services Act; Cassim 2008 
SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 181-182. See further clause 85(1)(a) read with (b) of the Draft Financial 
Markets Bill and clauses 83(1) of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012, which had related provisions.  
79  See further Huang 2009 C & SLJ 10; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 181-182.  
80  Sections 1041D and 1041G of the Corporations Act. Also see para 2.3 above.  
81  See ss 80 and 81 of the Financial Markets Act. This was also the position under ss 75 and 76 of 
the Securities Services Act; clauses 84 and 85 of the Draft Financial Markets Bill and clauses 82 
and 83 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012.  
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mechanisms are allowed in Australia when certain prescribed requirements are met,82 
while such mechanisms are generally treated as a defence against some market 
manipulation offences in South Africa.83 Nonetheless, in contrast to the situation in 
Australia,84 there are relatively few defences apart from the price-stabilisation defence 
that are available to any person accused of committing market manipulation offences 
in South Africa.85 
3 Available penalties and remedies 
The Corporations Act extends civil penalties, civil remedies86 and criminal penalties to 
any person who violates its provisions on market manipulation.87 
3.1  Criminal penalties 
Any person who engages in market manipulation activities is liable for a criminal 
offence and penalty.88 The discretion to institute criminal proceedings rests primarily 
with the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth DPP). 
Nonetheless, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) may, after 
consultation with the Commonwealth DPP, bring criminal proceedings against any 
person accused of contravening the relevant market abuse provisions in Australia.89 
                                        
82  Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 184-185. 
83  See s 80(4) of the Financial Markets Act. Similar provisions were previously outlined in s 75(3)(i) 
of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(i) of the Draft Financial Markets Bill; clause 82(3)(i) of 
the Financial Markets Bill, 2012; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 184-185; the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (the JSE) Listing Requirements, which outlines some 
obligations or requirements that must be complied with by the issuers of securities before engaging 
in price-stabilisation in South Africa. See further Rule 5.99 of the JSE Listing Requirements, which 
stipulates the various circumstances and conditions under which the price-stabilisation measures 
will be permitted by the JSE and the Financial Markets Act.  
84  Section 1317S of the Corporations Act. Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 184-185, 189. 
85  See ss 80 and 81 of the Financial Markets Act. It appears that the same approach was previously 
employed in ss 75 and 76 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 84 and 85 of the Draft Financial 
Markets Bill; clauses 82 and 83 of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc 
LJ (Part 2) 198-199.  
86  Section 1041I provides for civil liability against any person who violates s 1041E to s 1041H of the 
Corporations Act. 
87  Comino 2006 ABLR 428, 430-446; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 192; see further Ford, Austin 
and Ramsay Ford's Principles Looseleaf service update number 43, 9/2004 9406 [9.690] read with 
9/2004 9338 [9.605].  
88  Section 1308A of the Corporations Act; also see Comino 2006 ABLR 430-446. 
89  Comino 2006 ABLR 429-446. 
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Moreover, the prosecution of market manipulation and other market misconduct 
offences may be instituted within five years after the commission of the offence in 
question or at any time as stipulated by the Minister of Justice.90 Any person who 
engages in manipulation or other market misconduct offences91 will be liable for a 
maximum criminal penalty fine of Aus $22, 000 for individuals or Aus $110, 000 for a 
body corporate, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or both such 
fine and imprisonment.92 These penalties were recently increased by the Corporations 
Amendment (No 1) Act,93 to a maximum pecuniary fine of Aus $495, 000 or three 
times the profit gained or loss avoided, whichever is the greater,94 or ten years 
imprisonment,95 or both such fine and imprisonment, for individuals. The maximum 
criminal penalties for a body corporate were increased to a fine of Aus $4, 950, 000, 
or three times the profit made or loss avoided, or 10% of the body corporate's annual 
turnover during the relevant period in which the offence was committed, whichever is 
greater.96 This clearly suggests that market manipulation and other related market 
misconduct offences are all treated as criminal offences, as they carry the same 
penalty.97 In relation to this, the ASIC may further bring such criminal proceedings 
even after civil penalty proceedings for the same conduct have been instituted.98 
However, where a person has been convicted of a criminal offence for the same 
conduct, no civil penalty action will be additionally instituted against such person.99 
                                        
90  Section 1316 of the Corporations Act. 
91  Section 1041A to s 1041G read with s 1311of the Corporations Act.  
92  Sections 1311; 1312 and Schedule 3 item 309C of the Corporations Act. Also see s 4AA of the 
Crimes Act 12 of 1914 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Crimes Act. 
93  Corporations Amendment (No 1) Act 131 of 2010 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporations 
Amendment (No 1) Act.  
94  See the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.11. 
95  Generally see the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.11; also see 
Bowen 2010 http://goo.gl/bLM7eN; Constable 2011 MqJBL 107, for further details regarding these 
penalties. 
96  See Bowen 2010 http://goo.gl/7WXkYS; also see further the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill 
Explanatory Memorandum 3.11 and see further analysis on these new sanctions by Ewart and 
Tobias 2010 http://goo.gl/mJBDdj; Bowen 2010 http://goo.gl/bLM7eN. 
97  Austin 2009 http://goo.gl/3t76k5; also see a generally related article by Austin 2008 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1288970. 
98  Austin 2009 http://goo.gl/3t76k5. 
99  Section 1317N-s 1317P read with ss 1041I, 1317E-1317HA and 206C of the Corporations Act.  
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Likewise, as is the position under the Corporations Act in Australia,100 the Financial 
Markets Act provides criminal sanctions for market manipulation offences.101 
Nonetheless, in contrast to the position in Australia,102 the Financial Markets Act's 
criminal penalties for market manipulation103 might be less deterrent, particularly with 
regard to some unscrupulous big business persons, or companies which may easily 
afford to pay the R50 million fine and commit other market manipulation offences in 
the future.104 In this regard it is hoped that the Financial Markets Act will be amended 
in line with the Australian position105 to introduce sufficient and more deterrent 
maximum criminal penalties for individuals106 and juristic persons,107 with much higher 
maximum penalties being imposed on such juristic persons.108 Like its Australian 
counterpart,109 the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in South Africa has the main 
prerogative to institute criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of market 
manipulation.110 Furthermore, in South Africa the DPP may institute such proceedings 
only after referrals from the Financial Services Board (FSB).111 Nevertheless, unlike 
                                        
100  See related discussion above. 
101  See s 109(a) read with ss 80 and 81 of the Financial Markets Act, which directly outlaws any 
conduct which constitutes a market manipulation offence or which may constitute such an offence 
in South Africa. Also see similar comments in Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 108, 119-124; Cassim 
2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 193-195.  
102  See the related comments above. 
103  See s 109(a) of the Financial Markets Act.  
104  See Chitimira March 2014 MJSS 47, 53-54; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 194.  
105  See the related comments above. 
106  In the light of this it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact a 
specific provision which stipulates that an individual who is convicted of an offence relating to 
insider trading or market manipulation will be liable to a fine of up to R85 million, or to 
imprisonment for a period of not more than 25 years, or to both such a fine and imprisonment. 
107  It is further submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact a specific 
provision which stipulates that a juristic person or company that is convicted of an offence relating 
to insider trading or market manipulation will be liable to a maximum fine of R750 million, or to 
six times the profit made or loss avoided, or 20% of the company or juristic person's annual 
turnover during the period in which the offence was committed, whichever is greater. 
108  See the related remarks by Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; Chitimira and Lawack 2012 
Obiter 549-553. 
109  See the related remarks on the powers of the Commonwealth DPP above.  
110  See s 84(10) of the Financial Markets Act. Also see similar comments by Chitimira 2014 Speculum 
Juris 119-124; Luiz 2011 SA Merc LJ 151-172; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 193-195.  
111  Generally see s 84(10) of the Financial Markets Act. It appears that this approach was directly 
borrowed from previous provisions such as s 82(9) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(9) of 
the Draft Financial Markets Bill and clause 86(10) of the Financial Markets Bill, 2012. See further 
Luiz 2011 SA Merc LJ 151-172; Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 
(Part 2) 193-195, for related discussions on the enforcement of the market abuse ban by the FSB 
and the DPP.  
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the situation in Australia,112 the Financial Markets Act does not specifically provide 
whether the FSB may, in addition to administrative proceedings,113 bring its own 
criminal proceedings against the market manipulation offenders without initially 
referring such proceedings to the DPP and the relevant courts in South Africa.114 It is 
important to note, however, that the enforcement of the criminal sanctions for market 
manipulation and other related offences has to some extent been impeded by the 
insurmountable difficulties relating to the high evidentiary burden of proof required in 
the prosecution of such offences in both South Africa115 and Australia.116 In addition, 
the implementation of the criminal sanctions for market manipulation has so far been 
relatively more successful in Australia117 than in South Africa.118 This could in part 
because of the considerable number of cases that have come before the courts in 
Australia.119 In contrast, relatively few cases involving market manipulation offences 
have been successfully investigated and prosecuted in South Africa to date.120 
  
                                        
112  See the similar comments above. 
113  See s 82 of the Financial Markets Act. 
114  Apparently, such proceedings may be instituted by the FSB only if the DPP refuses to prosecute 
the market manipulation cases in question. See s 84(10) of the Financial Markets Act.  
115  See the related comments in Chitimira March 2014 MJSS 52-54; Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 
119-124; Chitimira and Lawack 2012 Obiter 549-553.  
116  Samuel 2005 http://www.accc.gov.au/Samuel_Paper_2005.htm; Constable 2011 MqJBL 107-110.  
117  Generally see some related comments above and see further Samuel 2005 
http://www.accc.gov.au/Samuel_Paper_2005.htm; Constable 2011 MqJBL 107-110. 
118  See the relevant market manipulation enforcement statistics by the FSB 2014 
https://goo.gl/RPpjMC, which show that from the period between 2006 and 2014, relatively few 
criminal cases of market manipulation were successfully investigated and prosecuted by both the 
FSB and the relevant courts. Also see the related comments on the enforcement of the market 
abuse ban by Chanetsa Business Report page number unknown; Blincoe 2001 
http://goo.gl/A4Wje7, where two Datatec directors, Jens Montanana and Robin Rindel were 
reportedly fined about R1 million each for insider trading by the FSB; Barron 2014 
http://goo.gl/RPqhWq, where Greg Blank was reportedly sentenced to eight years imprisonment 
for stock market-related fraud and front running in 1992. See further the related comments by 
Chitimira March 2014 MJSS 52-54; Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; generally see Chitimira 
and Lawack 2012 Obiter 549-553. 
119  R v Adler [2005] NSWSC 274; R v Adler [2005] 53 ACSR 471; Adler v R (2006) 57 ACSR 675; R v 
Williams [2005] NSWSC 315; R v Williams (2005) 216 ALR 113; also see Comino 2006 ABLR 440-
446.  
120  Generally see the related enforcement actions by the FSB in 2014 (FSB 2014 
https://goo.gl/RPpjMC), which shows that from the period between 2006 and 2014 relatively few 
criminal cases of market manipulation were successfully investigated and prosecuted by the FSB 
and the relevant courts. Also see the related analysis by Chitimira March 2014 MJSS 52-54; 
Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; generally see Chitimira and Lawack 2012 Obiter 549-553. 
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3.2  Civil penalties 
Civil penalties may also be imposed upon any person who violates market 
manipulation121 and other market misconduct provisions.122 Currently, such penalties 
may be imposed only under the civil penalty provisions.123 Put differently, the civil 
penalty provisions are now applicable to both the market misconduct and continuous 
disclosure provisions.124 Consequently, civil penalties may be brought against the 
offenders, either as financial services civil penalties or as corporation or scheme civil 
penalties.125 
The ASIC is statutorily empowered to institute any relevant civil action against the 
offenders.126 For example, the ASIC may impose civil pecuniary penalties of up to Aus 
$200, 000 on individuals and Aus $1million on a body corporate, and the recovered 
money will be utilised to compensate all the prejudiced persons.127 It is noteworthy 
that these pecuniary penalties were recently increased to enhance the combating of 
market manipulation and similar practices in Australia.128 In addition, the ASIC may 
disqualify the perpetrators of market manipulation and other market misconduct 
offences from the management of any company or corporation for a certain period.129 
The ASIC or the courts may declare (publicise) the existence of a violation, when 
satisfied that a particular person was involved in market manipulation or other related 
market misconduct offences.130 This publication is employed inter alia to discourage 
                                        
121  Sections 1041A-1041E of the Corporations Act.  
122  Sections 1041F-1041H of the Corporations Act. The civil penalty provisions were first introduced 
in 1993 and are now contained in Part 9.4B of the Corporations Act.  
123  Sections 1317E-1317HA read with s 206C of the Corporations Act.  
124  Sections 674-675 of the Corporations Act, which relates to continuous disclosure requirements in 
Australia; also see Longo 2001 https://goo.gl/31VrsC. 
125  The financial services civil penalties apply to any person who violates the market misconduct 
provisions while the corporation or scheme civil penalties apply to any contravention in relation to 
the continuous disclosure provisions. See ss 1317E(1)(ja), 1317J(3A) and 1041I of the 
Corporations Act.  
126  Sections 1317E-1317HA read with ss 206C, 1317J(1) and (2) of the Corporations Act.  
127  Sections 1317E-1317HA, s 206C of the Corporations Act. Also see related analysis by Austin 2009 
http://goo.gl/3t76k5 3; and further comments on the recently introduced new market abuse 
penalties by Bowen 2010 http://goo.gl/bLM7eN. 
128  Constable 2011 MqJBL 107 & generally see paragraph 3.1 above. 
129  See s 1317E to s 1317HA & s 206C of the Corporations Act. Also see Bowen 2010 
http://goo.gl/bLM7eN. 
130  Section 1317E(1) of the Corporations Act. Also see further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 192. 
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unscrupulous persons from engaging in market manipulation.131 The ASIC may further 
impose orders for civil penalties for punitive purposes against market manipulation 
offenders.132 Notably, the ASIC has a discretion regarding the actual amount to be 
imposed as punitive or pecuniary civil penalties against such offenders.133 In addition, 
further civil action against the offenders can be brought by the actual prejudiced 
person (a private right of action)134 and the relevant courts. For example, a court may, 
after it is satisfied that the contravention in question will materially prejudice the 
issuers of the financial products to which it relates,135 impose a civil compensatory 
action against the offenders to recover any damages incurred by the affected 
persons.136 
The financial services civil penalties have relatively improved the enforcement of the 
market manipulation and other market misconduct provisions in Australia to date.137 
Put differently, despite the fact that the lower standard of proof required in civil cases 
has not been quite utilised by both the ASIC and the courts to obtain settlements in 
market manipulation cases, the general enforcement of the market manipulation 
prohibition has been relatively successful in Australia.138 
                                        
131  See Welsh 2004 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 175, 187; Mann 1992 Yale LJ 1795, 1845.  
132  ASIC v Plymin [2003] VSC 123; ASIC v Plymin (2003) 46 ACSR 126; ASIC v Plymin (2003) 21 ACLC 
700, where the ASIC obtained banning orders, pecuniary penalties and compensation orders 
against Bernard Plymin, John Elliot and William Harrison in relation to their contravention of the 
market misconduct provisions, as directors of Water Wheel and its subsidiary Water Wheel Mills 
Pty Limited. Also see Comino 2005 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 48-67. 
133  However, where any financial services civil provision was violated, the courts or the ASIC may 
impose pecuniary penalties up to Aus $200 000 on the perpetrators of such offences. S 1317EA of 
the Corporations Act read with s 1317FA of the same Act. 
134  Section 1317J(3A) of the Corporations Act. 
135  Section 1317E(1) of the Corporations Act. 
136  Section 1041I of the Corporations Act read with s 1317S of the same Act. The Commonwealth DPP 
usually consults with the ASIC to determine whether to bring civil penalty actions or criminal 
proceedings in relation to any market abuse violations.  
137  Middleton 2003 C & SLJ 507-529.  
138  Constable 2011 MqJBL 92-96; Longo 2001 Keeping Good Companies 635; Andrews 2003 Am J 
Comp L 137, 146; Huang 2009 C & SLJ 12-15; Gilligan, Bird and Ramsay 1999 UNSWLJ 417, 424; 
Goldwasser 1998 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 111. See further Donald v ASIC (2001) 38 ACSR 10; Donald 
v ASIC [2001] AATA 366, the accused was found guilty of market manipulating the price relating 
to the affected shares (financial products). For further discussion on the theory, history and 
application of civil penalties in Australia, see Gething 1996 ABLR 375-390; Bird 1996 C & SLJ 405-
427.  
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On the contrary, apart from the provisions of s 6D of the Financial Institutions 
(Protection of Funds) Act,139 the Financial Markets Act's market manipulation 
provisions do not expressly give rise to civil or administrative140 liability on the part of 
the offenders in spite of the fact that they are relatively comparable and commendable 
internationally,141 especially with regard to the nature and scope of their application.142 
Consequently, it is hoped that South Africa will follow the example of Australia143 and 
other relevant jurisdictions on derivative civil penalties for market manipulation, to 
promptly introduce specific provisions for such penalties in the Financial Markets 
Act.144 In addition, apart from the provisions of s 6D of the Protection of Funds Act 
and the available common law remedies, it appears that the affected persons are not 
statutorily empowered to recover their losses through their own private civil litigation 
proceedings for market manipulation under the Financial Markets Act.145 Therefore, 
notwithstanding the fact that private persons do not have resources and investigatory 
powers similar to those of the FSB to institute the relevant actions against the 
                                        
139  Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 as amended, hereinafter referred to as 
the Protection of Funds Act. 
140  For instance, see s 82 of the Financial Markets Act, which provides that administrative sanctions 
as determined by the Enforcement Committee (EC) will be paid to prejudiced persons only in cases 
of insider trading, and there are no other provisions under Ch X entitled "Market Abuse" which 
expressly empower the courts to impose administrative sanctions against the market manipulation 
offenders. It appears that a civil remedy which was mainly enforced by the FSB under s 77 read 
with s 82 of the Securities Services Act has now been replaced by administrative sanctions. In 
relation to this, the Financial Markets Act now mainly provides for an administrative sanction that 
may be imposed on the market abuse offenders by the EC. See s 82 read with s 84 of the Financial 
Markets Act. This could suggest that the EC may now impose administrative sanctions upon the 
market manipulation offenders after referrals in terms of s 99 of the Financial Markets Act read 
with s 6A(2) of the Protection of Funds Act, subject to appeals in terms of s 6F read with s 6B to 
s 6I of the same Act. See further Luiz 2011 SA Merc LJ 151-172; Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 
119-124. 
141  The author submits that the Financial Markets Act's market manipulation provisions are relatively 
comparable to similar provisions in other jurisdictions such as the USA, the UK and the European 
Union (EU).  
142  Ss 80 and 81 read with s 109(a) of the Financial Markets Act. Also see generally Cassim 2008 SA 
Merc LJ (Part 1) 33-36; Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; Chitimira March 2014 MJSS 53-
54.  
143  See the related Australian discussion above. 
144  See ss 80 and 81 of the Financial Markets Act, which do not provide for any civil penalties for 
market manipulation.  
145  Sections 80 and 81 of the Financial Markets Act. This flaw was also present in ss 75 and 76 of the 
Securities Services Act;. Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 191-193. The author submits 
that the Financial Markets Act should have considered the Australians' Corporations Act approach, 
of not relying on criminal and administrative penalties alone for market manipulation. See further 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 191-195; 198-199.  
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offenders on their own, it is hoped that the Financial Markets Act will be amended in 
line with the position in Australia146 to provide a private right of action for the affected 
persons to claim their own civil or administrative damages directly from the market 
manipulation offenders. Moreover, in contrast to the Australian position,147 the civil 
remedies and civil penalties for market manipulation are not statutorily classified 
differently under the Financial Markets Act.148 
3.3 Civil remedies 
Civil remedies are also available to all the persons prejudiced by market 
manipulation149 and other related market misconduct offences.150 For instance, the 
ASIC may institute civil compensation orders against any person who contravenes the 
market manipulation and other market misconduct provisions.151 The ASIC has further 
discretion and authority to determine the actual appropriate civil compensatory 
remedies that will be granted to any persons affected by market manipulation and 
other related offences.152 
In addition, a private right of action is expressly provided for any persons who incurred 
losses as a result of market manipulation and other market misconduct violations by 
way of application for a compensation order.153 This enables the affected persons to 
claim their civil compensatory damages timeously and directly from the perpetrators 
of market manipulation and other related offences.154 As stated earlier,155 the relevant 
                                        
146  See the earlier Australian discussion above. 
147  Section 1041I of the Corporations Act. Also see the earlier Australian discussion above and the 
related comments in para 3.3 below.  
148  See ss 80 and 81 of the Financial Markets Act, which do not classify or provide any distinct civil 
remedies and civil penalties for market manipulation. Also see the related comments by Chitimira 
March 2014 MJSS 53-54.  
149  Section 1041A-1041E of the Corporations Act. 
150  Section 1041F-1041H of the Corporations Act. 
151  Section 1317E-1317HA, 206C read with s 1325 of the Corporations Act. 
152  Section 1317J(1) and (2) of the Corporations Act read with s 1317E(1)(ja) of the same Act. Also 
see Austin 2009 http://goo.gl/3t76k5 3.  
153  Section1317J(3A) of the Corporations Act read with ss 1324A, 1324B, 1325(2) of the same Act, 
which deals with injunctive relief during prosecutions, orders for the disclosure of relevant 
information, and compensatory orders.  
154  Sections 1041I and 1317HA of the Corporations Act. This is usually referred to as a private right 
of action or piggy-back civil rights against the offenders, who are then required to compensate the 
claimants or the affected investors.  
155  See the related comments in para 3.2 above. 
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courts or the ASIC may make a declaration that certain conduct constituted a market 
manipulation violation.156 Importantly, the ASIC or any other applicant in a civil action 
for remedies may rely on such a declaration without being required to further prove 
the actual occurrence of market manipulation or other related contravention in 
question.157 A declaration of the contravention of market manipulation or other market 
misconduct provisions is therefore a useful tool to expedite actions for civil remedies 
by both the courts and the ASIC.158 
Furthermore, the ASIC may seek civil or administrative freezing orders or injunctions 
from the courts against the perpetrators of market manipulation and other market 
misconduct offences.159 This remedy is, among other things, aimed at directly 
preventing or stopping the offenders from continuing with a particular illicit conduct 
or their market manipulation and market misconduct violations.160 In addition, the 
ASIC or the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) may take disciplinary action against 
a market participant or any person who committed market manipulation and other 
related offences. In essence, this implies that such matters will be brought to the ASX 
Disciplinary Tribunal, which will then decide on the appropriate civil remedy to be 
imposed against such offenders.161  
Any prejudiced person or the ASIC162 may seek banning orders or disqualification 
orders from the courts against those who violate market manipulation or other market 
misconduct provisions.163 Notably, the banning or disqualification orders may be 
implemented against the offenders permanently or for a specified period.164 Therefore, 
                                        
156  Section 1317E(1) read with s 1041I of the Corporations Act. Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 
(Part 2) 192.  
157  Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 192; see further the related comments and analysis by Morrell 
2006 http://www.takeovers.govnt.nz/speeches/km_290506.pdf 11-12.  
158  Morrell 2006 http://www.takeovers.govnt.nz/speeches/km_290506.pdf 12. 
159  Sections 1323, 1324 of the Corporations Act.  
160  See generally s 1325 read with ss 1323 and 1324 of the Corporations Act. Also see Austin 2009 
http://goo.gl/3t76k5 3.  
161  For more details regarding the role of the ASX Disciplinary Tribunal, see ASX 2010 
http://goo.gl/6DP709; also see generally the ASX 2010 http://goo.gl/sOR5t4 Rule 28.3.1, for 
related analysis regarding the ASX Rules relating to the functions of the ASX Disciplinary Tribunal 
and further related remarks by Austin 2009 http://goo.gl/3t76k5 5, 7.  
162  Section 920B of the Corporations Act. 
163  Section 1041A-1041H of the Corporations Act; Constable 2011 MqJBL 96-99.  
164  Section 920B(2) of the Corporations Act. 
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the courts and the ASIC have discretionary powers to determine the exact period 
under which the accused persons will be banned or disqualified from executing their 
managerial duties in the affected corporations.165 Moreover, any person who can show 
or prove that he suffered a loss as a result of the contravention of continuous 
disclosure provisions will recover his damages from the offenders concerned.166 
In a nutshell, although it may be argued that the civil remedies are at the bottom of 
the Australian securities law enforcement pyramid, which has civil penalties in the 
middle and criminal penalties at the top, such remedies have to date relatively 
enhanced the general combating of market manipulation and other related offences 
in Australia.167  
On the other hand, as stated above,168 apart from the available common law remedies 
and the provisions of s 6D of the Protection of Funds Act, the Financial Markets Act 
does not have specific civil remedies for market manipulation.169 This could imply that 
the Financial Markets Act treats and interprets market manipulation simply as a wrong 
against the financial markets rather than as a wrong against all the affected 
persons.170 This may further suggest that its market manipulation prohibition is 
directed only at the public good and not necessarily at the individual or affected 
person's protection.171 It is argued, however, that such affected persons are not 
statutorily precluded from seeking their own additional civil remedies, apart from 
                                        
165  Section 920A(1) of the Corporations Act; ASIC v Adler [2003] NSWCA 131; ASIC v Adler (2003) 46 
ACSR 504; ASIC v Adler (2003) 21 ACLC 1810, where Adler was disqualified for 20 years and 
ordered to pay approximately Aus $7million compensation jointly with Adler Corporation Pty 
Limited and Williams. In addition, Adler was further ordered to pay Aus $450 000 pecuniary 
penalties. See further the related articles by Main AFR 6; Johnston AFR 1, where the ASIC 
successfully requested and imposed on Vizard, a five-year ban on managing companies and about 
Aus $390 000 compensatory and pecuniary penalties.  
166  Section 1317J(3A) read with ss 1317J(1) and (2) of the Corporations Act; Goldwasser 1999b C & 
SLJ 210; Longo 2001 https://goo.gl/31VrsC 41. 
167  Longo 2001 https://goo.gl/31VrsC 21, 23; Goldwasser 1999b C & SLJ 210. 
168  See the related remarks in para 3.2 above. 
169  Sections 80 and 81 read with s 109(a) of the Financial Markets Act. Conspicuously, this flaw was 
previously enshrined in ss 75 and 77 read with s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act. See further 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 1) 33-36; Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; Chitimira March 
2014 MJSS 53-54. 
170  See the related discussions by Luiz 2002 JBL 183; Henning and Du Toit 2000 Company Lawyer 29-
36; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 192. Also see Chitimira March 2014 MJSS 53-54, for further 
related analysis.  
171  See further Henning and Du Toit 2000 Company Lawyer 29-36, for a related discussion.  
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private rights of action, directly from the market manipulation offenders through the 
provisions of the Protection of Funds Act172 or any other relevant legislation. In 
addition, unlike the situation in Australia,173 no provision was made in the Financial 
Markets Act for the competent courts or the FSB to make a declaration of 
contravention of the market manipulation provisions whenever such contravention 
occurs.174 As a result, the preventive and deterrent effect attached to the declaration 
of contravention by the courts in Australia is obviously absent in South Africa.175 
Moreover, in contrast to the position in Australia,176 and as already stated above, apart 
from relying on the relevant provisions of the Protection of Funds Act,177 the EC may 
seek an administrative compensatory monetary remedy payable to the FSB for later 
reimbursement to the affected persons only with regard to insider trading violations 
under section 82 of the Financial Markets Act.178  
  
                                        
172  See s 6D read with ss 6A, 6B, 6C, 6E, 6F and 6G of the Protection of Funds Act; see further Cassim 
2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 192, 195; also see Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; Chitimira 
March 2014 MJSS 52-56.  
173  See the related comments above. 
174  Put differently, it is merely stated that the FSB may, by notice on its official website or by means 
of other appropriate public media, publish any outcome, status or details of market abuse 
investigations if such publication is in the public interest. See s 84(2)(e) read with ss 78, 80, 81 
and 82 of the Financial Markets Act. Also see similar remarks in Chitimira and Lawack 2013 Obiter 
200-217; Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 108-124.  
175  This could have contributed in part to the inconsistent enforcement of the market manipulation 
ban in South Africa. See the FSB Annual Report 2011 99-101 and the FSB Annual Report 2013 
128-130, for related comments on the new and completed investigations, related issues on 
administrative penalties and appeals of market abuse cases in 2011 and 2013 respectively. In 
relation to this, it is also stated that the Directorate of Market Abuse (DMA) is currently 
investigating 21 listed companies for market manipulation and other market abuse activities. 
However, notwithstanding all these commendable efforts to combat market manipulation and 
other illicit market abuse practices, only 337 cases of market abuse have been investigated in 
South Africa from 1999 to date. Moreover, about 259 of these cases were closed because there 
was insufficient or no evidence that the relevant market abuse provisions had been contravened. 
Consequently, about R95 million damages and penalties were recovered from the offenders in only 
72 cases of market abuse which were successfully investigated and settled through the FSB during 
the same period. See the DMA 2014 FSB Bulletin 8. 
176  See the related comments above and a similar discussion in para 3.2 above. 
177  See s 6D read with ss 6A, 6B, 6C, 6E; 6F and 6G of the Protection of Funds Act; see further Cassim 
2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 192, 195; also see Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; Chitimira 
March 2014 MJSS 52-56.  
178  S 82 read with s 99 of the Financial Markets Act; s 6A(2) of the Protection of Funds Act. See further 
related analysis by Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ (Part 2) 195; Luiz 2011 SA Merc LJ 151-172; Chitimira 
2014 Speculum Juris 119-124. Also see similar remarks in para 3.2 above.  
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4 Concluding remarks 
As highlighted above,179 it is noteworthy that the prohibition of market manipulation 
was introduced relatively early in both South Africa and Australia. For instance, market 
manipulation has been discouraged under common law in both South Africa180 and 
Australia.181 It is also interesting to note that relatively similar enforcement 
approaches182 are employed to combat market manipulation in both South Africa and 
Australia.183 Moreover, relatively similar types of market manipulation are statutorily 
prohibited in both jurisdictions.184 However, notwithstanding these commendable 
efforts, some flaws are still present in the current South African and Australian market 
manipulation prohibition. For example, the available criminal penalties for market 
manipulation are still not sufficient of a deterrent for the purposes of increasing the 
curbing of market manipulation activities in Australia and South Africa.185 
Consequently, it is submitted that the Corporations Act and the Financial Markets Act 
should be amended in order to enact higher separate and distinct maximum market 
manipulation criminal penalties for both individuals and juristic persons.186 It is further 
recommended that the Commonwealth DPP and the DPP should continue to co-
operate with the ASIC and the FSB respectively in order to consistently enhance the 
criminal prosecution of market manipulation cases in Australia and South Africa.187 It 
is also submitted, notwithstanding the purported paradigm shift from the old civil 
penalty regime188 to administrative penalties for market abuse in South Africa, that 
                                        
179  See the historical analysis and other relevant discussions in the sub-headings under para 2 above. 
180  Generally see Henning and Du Toit 2000 JJS 155-165. 
181  See the earlier comments in paras 2.1 and 2.4 above. 
182  For instance, criminal and administrative penalties are used to discourage market manipulation in 
both South Africa and Australia. Moreover, the Commonwealth DPP and the DPP have the main 
prerogative to institute criminal proceedings against market manipulation offenders in Australia 
and South Africa respectively. See the related discussions in paras 3.1-3.3 above.  
183  See the related discussions in paras 2.1-2.4, 3.1-3.3 above. 
184  See the related comments in paras 2.3 and 2.4 above. 
185  See the related remarks in para 3.1 above. 
186  See the discussion in para 3.1 above and similar remarks by Chitimira March 2014 MJSS 53-56; 
Chitimira 2014 Speculum Juris 119-124; Chitimira & Lawack 2012 Obiter 548-553. 
187  See the related discussion in para 3.1 above. 
188  See s 77 of the Securities Services Act. 
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civil, criminal and administrative penalties should be expressly extended to both insider 
trading and market manipulation under the Financial Markets Act.189 
It is also submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended in line with the 
Australian approach190 in order to enact provisions that expressly extend the scope of 
application of its market manipulation prohibition to other related dishonest conduct 
such as high frequency trading, front running, short selling and market rigging. In 
addition, it is hoped that the Financial Markets Act will be amended to provide an 
adequate statutory definition of the concept of market manipulation involving all the 
elements of this offence as well as the various types of market manipulation practices, 
to enhance the combating of such practices in South Africa.191 Lastly, it is 
recommended that market manipulation should be statutorily treated as an indictable 
offence for deterrence purposes and to enhance its prosecution in South Africa.  
                                        
189  See the related discussions in paras 3.1-3.3 above. 
190  See Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act. Also see para 2.3 for further analysis of the prohibition on 
market manipulation and other market misconduct practices under the Corporations Act.  
191  See the related comments in para 2.4 above. 
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